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This research establishes the persistent e¤ect of institutions on culture exploiting the
natural experiment of migration. It advances and empirically establishes the hypothesis
that lower institutional quality at the origin country of a migrant is associated with higher
trust towards host country institutions. The inated trust of migrants is documented
as the Great Expectations e¤ect and is intriguing in three respects. First it contradicts
with the empirically observed attitude of migrants with respect to interpersonal trust,
where low quality of institutions is associated with lower interpersonal trust in both the
host and the home country. Second, the inated trust persists for both rst and second
generation migrants. Third, the e¤ect of home institutions is stronger than the e¤ect
of mean trust at home conrming that institutions prevail over culture. The formation
of Great Expectations has profound policy implications as it generates lower demand
for regulation and reduced political participation. These ndings further highlight
the interplay between culture and institutions and the spillover e¤ects of institutions
operating via migration.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between culture and political institutions has long been debated and explored in
the economics literature. Understanding how culture evolves can contribute to pinning down
di¤erences across societies that cannot be fully accounted for by geographical, historical and
economic di¤erences. Moreover understanding the mechanics of culture can help understand
how culture interacts with institutions and how one feedbacks to the other.
Attempting to give a response to the question whether culture or institutions came rst
is tantamount to the "chicken-egg" question, therefore addressing the issue of endogeneity
inherent in their between relationship is a challening task. A number of researchers have
adopted intuitive strategies, such as abrupt exogenous institutional changes, in order to be
able to estimate an one-way causal e¤ect from institutions to culture. Typical examples of this
literature are the natural experiment of socialism or the fall of the iron curtain (e.g. Shiller
et al. (1992), Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007)).
This research attempts to undertake this challenge via using the natural experiment of
migration in order to establish the persistent e¤ect of institutions on culture. In particular,
it is argued that lower institutional quality at the country of origin of a migrant is associated
with higher trust towards institutions at the host country. This inated trust of migrants
is documented as the Great Expectations e¤ect. This result is interesting and intriguing for
several reasons. First, it establishes a persistent e¤ect of institutions over cultural attitudes
of migrants. Interestingly, the inated trust of migrants is transmitted even to the second
generation migrants. Yet, the interaction of the second generation migrants with their origin
country institutions is in most cases minimal (if non-existent). Therefore, this result is driven
by the cultural attitudes transmitted to them by their parents.
However, even in the context of the rst generation migrants, where theGreat Expecta-
tions e¤ect is even stronger, the result is suggestive of another dimension along which migrant
selection operates, i.e., their preference for good institutions. Whereas bad institutional
quality at the origin country has a negative e¤ect on their trust towards native institutions,
this attitude is reversed once they decide to migrate. Upon migration, low institutional quality
at the origin country is associated with inated trust in the host coutnry institutions.
This nding is surprising in several dimensions. First, it is not clear what should be
anticipated as far as migrantstrust in the host institutions is concerned. On the one hand, to
the extend that their decision to migrate is driven by purely economic conditions and to the
extend that better institutions are associated with better economic performance, one would
anticipate that indeed bad institutional quality at the origin country is associated with more
trust towards the institutions of the host country. On the other hand though, assimilation
of migrants is hardly fully achieved. Even in the context of developed European countries
the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments and the rise of extreme right wing parties is indicative
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of the fact that migrants do not have full access to all the institutions. Therefore their
exclusion could make them less trustful towards the host institutions. The ndings of this
research establish that the rst line of reasoning prevails, even after controlling for a number
of covariates that capture the assimilation rate of a migrants culture. Migrants despite being
potentially discriminated against, they persistently inate their trust towards the institutions
of the host country.
A second element that is surprising is that migrantstrust is inated only towards the
host institutions. When it comes to interpersonal trust the ndings are quite the opposite,
suggesting that bad institutional quality is associated with lower interpersonal trust in both
the host and home country. This suggests that the great expectations of migrants are in
place only when it comes to more abstract notions of institutions (e.g., the legal system or
politicians) with whom they do not directly interact. On the contrary, when it comes to
institutions with which they directly interact (e.g., education or the health system) they do
not manifest inated levels of trust. This is suggestive of the fact that their expectations
adjust more rapidly.
So far only the e¤ect of the country of origin institutions on culture has been analyzed.
However a strand of the cultural economics literature emphasizes that attitudes at the origin
country also manifest inertia.1 Analytically, this implies that it is not only the quality of
institutions (e.g., corruption or bureaucracy) that has an e¤ect on trust towards institutions,
but also the mean level of trust at the origin country towards institutions that a¤ects individual
attitudes. This representative culture has been shaped over decades and a¤ects individual
attitudes via indirect transmission mechanisms (i.e., socialization). To distinguish between
these two forces of culture formation the empirical analysis runs a horserace regression between
home quality of institutions (proxied by the Corruption Perception Index) and the average
trust attitudes (proxied by the mean level of trust towards institutions) at the home country.
The ndings are rather interesting. First, in line with the ndings of the literature, mean
attitudes at home have a persistent e¤ect on the attitudes of migrants at the host country,
i.e., individual coming from less trustful countries tend to distrust institutions more in the
host country as well. Howewer, the great expectations e¤ect, driven by institutional quality, is
very strong and operates in the opposite direction, i.e. individuals coming from more corrupt
countries tend to inate their trust towards the institutions of the host country (despite the
fact on average they are most distrustful than individuals coming from countries with better
institutional quality). Overall, the results of the horserace establish that the great expectations
e¤ect prevails.
Last but not least, it is important to understand what are the policy implications of the
formation of great expectations, an issue that becomes increasingly important in the presence
1See e.g., the literature on preferences for redistribution or environmental preferences (Luttmer and Singhal,
2011; Litina et al., 2014)
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of large scale migration. The results of the paper suggest, following the rational of Aghion
et al. (2010), that higher trust of individuals towards institutions is associated with lower
demand for regulation in the host country and thus lower willingness to actively participate
in politics. The value added of this approach, is that instead of adopting as the explanatory
variable the level of trust (an approach that su¤ers from endogeneity), it adopts the measure
of average quality of institutions at the home country, a measure that is exogenous to their
demand for regulation. Thus this approach provides an exogenous test to establish the e¤ect
of trust on the demand for regulation. The exogeneity assumption is particularly true for
second generation migrants.
Evaluating this political outcome is beyond the scope of the analysis. Yet one can
identify both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side it can desirable since lower
demand for regulation is associated with lower actual regulation and lower bureaucratic burden
(Aghion et al., 2010). On the negative side it can be argues that less active citizen impose a
lower level of checks and balances towards institutions.
A second reason that makes these ndings crucial in the context of policy, is that they
highlight the interplay between institutions and culture and provide a consice channel via
which culture and institutions interact. This channel is particularly active in the modern
world where large scale migration is a fact for most developed countries. Institutions in the
host country foster cultural attitudes that ultimately a¤ect institutions in the host country.
Section 2 explores in detail the related literature. Section 3 of the paper describes the
data, the empirical strategy and discusses the issue of selective migration. Section 4, presents
the baseline empirical results of the paper. Section 5 discusses some issues related to the
baseline analysis, whereas Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to several strands of the literature on cultural economics. First it builds
upon the literature that identities the transmission of cultural traits via exploiting the natural
experiment of migration. Giuliano (2007) has exploited variations in the living arrangements
of second generation migrants living in the US to establish that the sexual revolution of
the 70s had a di¤erential impact on living arrangements in Northern and Southern Europe.
Fernández and Fogli (2009) have exploited variations in the fertility of second generation
women currently residing in the US and have established that di¤erences in fertility can be
traced to di¤erences in culture. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) establish that the structure
of the family has a pronounced e¤ect on economic behavior and attitudes of migrants and
a¤ects both labor force participation and mobility of women and the youth. Algan and
Cahuc (2010) have exploited the cultural transmission of trust traits in order to construct a
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panel for trust attitudes and estimate a causal e¤ect of trust on growth. Luttmer and Singhal
(2011) highlight that di¤erences in preferences for redistribution are positively correlated to the
mean preferences of the country of origin. Carpantier and Litina (2014) exploited the inherited
component in religiosity of second generation migrants to estimate the e¤ect of several aspects
of religiosity on economic outcomes. Litina et al. (2014) argue that environmental preferences
are not a¤ected by the country of origin environmental conditions, instead what prevails is
the mean preferences at the origin country.
Second, the paper relates to the literature that explores the persistent e¤ect of institu-
tions on culture. The main challenge of this literature is to identify changes in the institutional
regime that are exogenous to the forces of cultural evolution. Shiller et al. (1992) explored the
e¤ect of socialism on individual traits by exploiting the collapse of communism. Their ndings
suggest that there is hardly any e¤ect on traits such as entrepreneurial spirit, leadership
or risk attitudes. Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) exploiting the natural experiment
of the German unication they establish that East Germans are more favorable towards
redistribution and state intervention. Becker et al. (2011) advance the hypothesis that the
Habsburg empire has a long lasting e¤ect on current attitudes of individual with respect to
trust in local public services as well as with respect to corruption in courts and the police.
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) exploiting exogenous variation from macroeconomic shocks
establish that individuals who have been through a recession at the early stages of their life
are more favorable towards government redistribution and are more left-wing oriented.
The interplay between culture and institutions is also a central theme in this literature.
This nexus has been identied in Aghion et al. (2010) who explore the correlation between
regulation and distrust and argue that in the presence of a high level of trust there is low
demand for regulation. Alesina et al. (2010) establish the e¤ect of family ties on labor
market regulation and nd two di¤erent equilibria characterized by high (low) mobility and
unregulated labor markets (labor market rigidity) in the presence of strong (weak) family ties.
Pinotti (2012) shows that di¤erences in trust capture most of the variation in entry regulations.
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014) argue that culture prevails over institutions and
can account for within ethnicity di¤erences in economic performance, as proxied by light
density. The interplay between institutions and culture has also been widely developed in the
context of the comparative development literature (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Ashraf and
Galor, 2011b; Galor, 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Andersen et al., 2011; Ashraf and
Galor, 2013; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2013)).
This paper conrtibutes both in establishing a causal e¤ect from institutions to culture
and in capturing the interplay between the two. First it exploits variations in the quality
of institutions at the origin country to explore whether home institutions a¤ect the cultural
attitudes of migrants. Interestingly, the ndings suggest the presence of an inated level of
trust documented as the great expectations e¤ect. Second, the policy results of this paper
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indicate that migrants coming from more corrupt countries tend to trust politicians more and
thus demand less regulation. This implies both a lower burden of bureaucracy and a lower
level of checks and balances. Whether the overall e¤ect is on the positive or negative side
depends on the relative strength of each e¤ect.
Third, it relates to a sociological literature that traces high levels of political trust
across migrants, the so-called acculturation hypothesis. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) argue
that citizens from highly corrupt countries tend to express more negative evaluations about
the political system and trust civil servants less. They also argue that migrants form high
expectations with respect to political institutions in the new country which are initially fullled
but do not carry to the next generations. Similarly a number of studies have argued that
migrants coming from poor countries with low quality of institutions tend to manifest high
levels of trust that dissipate over time with the length of residence and dissipate in the second
generation (Michelson, 2003; Wenzel, 2006; Maxwell, 2010; Roder and Muhlau, 2012; Adman
and Stromblad, 2013; Roder and Mohlau, 2011).
This research empirically explores the sources of the acculturation hypothesis. More-
over, it dissects the forces behing the formation of culture. It identies two opposing forces,
the e¤ect of institutions at the origin country vs the e¤ect of mean attitudes at the origin
country. It establishes the presence of a great expectations e¤ect, driven by institutions, that
is stronger than the e¤ect of mean attitudes. The results suggest that this e¤ect is present
only in the case of abstract institutions (e.g., the politicians). When it comes to institutions
with which the migrants interact daily (e.g., education) adjustmen takes place instantaneously.
Interestingly and contrary to the predicitions of the sociology literature, it establishes that
this e¤ect is persistent and is transmitted to the second generation migrants as well.
Last, it contributes to a large literature that has explored the e¤ect of interpersonal
trust on the society and the economy. See e.g. Knack and Keefer (1997); Guiso et al. (2006)
for an exploration of the e¤ect of social capital on economic performance, Guiso et al. (2004)
for the e¤ect of social capital on nancial markets, Sangnier (2013) for the e¤ect of trust on
macroecnomic stability and Algan and Cahuc (2010) for the (causal) e¤ect of trust on growth.
Whereas the analysis in the paper focuses primarily in political trust, nevertheless
the results on interpersonal trust have been explored as well. The ndings are intriguing
as they suggest that the great expectations e¤ect is not present in the case of interpresonal
trust. Lower institutional quality implies less interpresonal trust both at the host and the
origin country. Moreover, in the horserace between the e¤ect of institutions and of mean
interpersonal trust both e¤ects prevail.
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3 Data, Empirical Strategy and Selection
3.1 The Data
The analysis employs data from four waves of the European Social Survey (2004-2010), a cross
sectional survey conducted in a number of European countries.2 The ESS is a cross-national
survey that quanties the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of citizens in more than
thirty European countries. In particular the ESS sample comprises individuals who currently
reside in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Turkey and Ukraine.
One element in the construction of the dataset is that it provides a migrant identier
that allows to trace migrants up to the second generation, as well as specic information
about the mothers and the fathers country of origin. This element is crucial since it allows
researchers to exploit the natural experiment of migration in order to explore the evolution
of cultural traits. The identifying assumption is that when migrants move to a host country
their current attitudes are no longer directly a¤ected by the country of origin living conditions
and institutions, only via their e¤ect on culture (Fernández and Fogli, 2009).
The analysis reports attitudes of N=22311 rst and second generation migrants, whose
fathers originate from 167countries all over the globe and have migrated in 30 European
countries. Tables A.1- A.6 describe the immigration ows by birth country. The rst column in
each table shows the country of origin, Column (2) indicates the number of distinct destination
countries in the sample, Column (3) indicates the number of immigrants coming from the
country of origin, Column (4) indicates the most prevalent destination country, whereas
the last Column reveals the number of migrants that have migrated to the most prevalent
destination country. Similarly, Table A.7 in the Appendix describes the migration ows
by destination country. The rst column indicates the destination countries in the sample,
Column (2) the number of distinct birth countries of all migrants that have participated
in the ESS questionaire, Column (3) the total number of immigrants in the destination
country, Column (4) the most prevalent birth country and the last column the total number
of immigrants coming from the most prevalent country.
Using the migrant identier, the sample of migrants is distinguished between rst and
second generation migrants (N1 = 13352 andN2 = 8959 correspondingly). To identify the
migrantscountry of origin, the analysis employs the individualscountry of origin for the rst
generation migrants and the fathers country of origin for the second generation migrants.3
2The rst wave is omitted as it does not provide information on the migrant identier.
3The results are robust to choosing the mothers country of origin instead. Results are reported in Table
16 in the robustness section.
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The baseline analysis is conducted using the total sample of migrants in order to maximize the
number of observations, however the results are replicated for the sample of rst and second
generation migrants separately, in order to mitigate selective selection concerns (Tables 10
and 11 correspondingly).4
Respondents are given the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10
how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust
an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s...." for all
four main variables that will be used in the current papers, i.e. parliament, the legal system,
politicians and the police.
As far as interpersonal trust is concerned, respondents are given the statement "Gener-
ally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful
in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you cant be too
careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted".
The basic measure of institutional quality employed in the baseline analysis is the
Corruption Perception Index. The index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most
corrupt country. The measure has been modied compared to the original one to facilitate
interpretation of the results. The index is aggregated over the period 1996-2000, in order to
address any concerns with respect to the fact that it is a perception measure that uctuates
signicantly. To further ensure the robustness of the results though, alterative measures are
employed for di¤erent time periods.5
The ESS also provides information about the age of the respondent, the gender,
employment status, the highest level of education achieved, level of income, parental and
spousal education, the religious denomination in which he belongs, citizenship, belonging to
a discriminated group or not, and whether the individual voted or not in the latest election.
Appendix C provides a detailed description of all the variables used in the baseline
analysis and the robustness.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The aim of the paper is to establish that low institutional quality in the home country is
positively a¤ecting the trust of migrants in institutions such as the parliament and the legal
system, i.e. the migrants form Great Expectations about the hosts country institutions.
This result is intriguing as it contradicts a standard prediction in this literature, i.e. that
interpersonal trust in the origin country is positively a¤ecting trust of migrants in the host
country.
4As will be analyzed below thought, selective migration in the context of the current research question is
not an issue. The study partly identies a dimension along which selection may occur.
5See for instance Tables 12 and 13 in the robustness section.
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To establish the persistent e¤ect of institutions on culture the analysis is conducted in
two stages.
Stage 1: The Persistent E¤ect of Institutions over Culture In the rst stage
the e¤ect of institutions at the origin country on migrantstrust in institutions at the host
country is explored.
The reduced form model is
Tjhit = 0 + 1Ci +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (1)
where T is an index of the level of trust of individual j; residing in host country h,
with ancestry i, who participated in the tth ESS round. Four di¤erent measures of trust are
employed, i.e. trust in the parliament, in the legal system, in politicians and the police. Ci
is a measure of quality of institutions that the individual j was faced with in his ancestry
country i:6 The analysis controls for a vector of individual controls such as age, age square,
gender, employment status and educational level.7 r is a vector of host country xed e¤ects
that captures all unobserved heterogeneity at the host country level. Tt is a vector of ESS
round xed e¤ects aimed to capture round specic shocks that could have had an e¤ect on
individual responses. "jri is an individual specic error term. The standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the dimension of the country-of-ancestry.8
The empirical analysis establishes that lower quality of institutions in the home coun-
try is correlated with higher trust in institutions in the host country. This suggests that
institutional quality has a persistent e¤ect on trust of migrants, an e¤ect that is not in line
with the e¤ect that the institutions have on the trust of natives.9
Stage 2: Horserace Regressions between Institutional Quality and Mean
Preferences at the Origin Country The second stage explores whether indeed insti-
tutions prevail over preferences and their e¤ect on cultural traits. The estimated equation
is
6Or his ancestors for the case of second generation migrants.
7Tables 14 and 15 control for a multitude of additional individual controls such as income, citizenship and
other controls that capture the assimilation process of the individual. These controls are not included in the
baseline analysis due to the fact that the number of observations is signicantly reduced.
8Table 18 explores the robustness of the results to clustering the standard errors both at the host and the
origin country dimension. The results are also robust to clustering at the dimension of the origin country and
of the ESS round.
9Correlating native trust in institutions with the quality of local institutions yields a negative correlation
for the sample of ESS countries. A formal empirical analysis is not undertaken since such a regression would
su¤er from severe endogeneity, however Table B.1 report the regression coe¢ cient for trust of natives regressed
on home institutions and the correlation is positive and highly signicant, suggesting that lower quality of
institutions is associated with lower trust of native towards home institutions.
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Tjhit = 0 + 1Ci + MPi +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (2)
where MPi denotes mean preferences at home with respect to each trust measure, i.e.
mean trust in parliament, legal system, politicians and the police. Since the mean measures
are derived by the ESS sample after excluding all migrants residing in a country, the number
of countries is restricted to the 30 available ESS countries. Nevertheless, the results strongly
suggest that whereas mean preference at the home country is positively (and in some cases
signicantly) correlated with trust of migrants, yet the dominating e¤ect is that of institutional
quality. The coe¢ cient 1 is still positive and highly signicant.
Policy Implications Last, the analysis explores the policy implications of these
results. In line with the argumentation of (Aghion et al., 2010), the analysis explores whether
this higher trust of migrants, triggered by the bad quality of institutions at the origin country,
is associated with less demand for regulation. The reduced form model is
Rjhit = 0 + 1Ci +2Ij +3h +4Tt + "jhit (3)
where R is an index of the level of demand for regulation of individual j; residing in
host country h, with ancestry i, who participated in the t ESS round. Four di¤erent measures
of demand for regulation are employed, i.e. demand for banning non-democratic parties,
participation in demonstrations, signing petitions and the level of interest in local politics. As
an exogenous proxy for individual trust the analysis employs the measure of the quality of
institutions at the home country, Ci The remaining of the analysis is as described in equation
(2).
The empirical analysis establishes that lower quality of institutions in the home country
is correlated with lower demand for regulation in the host country. This e¤ect is partly trig-
gered by the high trust in local institutions. Estimating the structural equation conrms that
one of the channels linking lower demand for regulation is the "inated" trust in institutions.10
In all the three estimated models the identifying assumption for 1 is that there are no
omitted factors that are correlated with the average institutional quality in the origin country
that a¤ect the individuals preference for redistribution in the country of residence. To the
extend that trust attitudes are a¤ected by factors present at the host country they will be
captured by the host country xed e¤ects. Anything at the origin country that has a persistent
e¤ect on trust attitudes is falling under the broad category of culture (Fernández and Fogli,
2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).
10Table ?? runs a horserace regression between quality of institutions at the origin country and trust in
institutions.
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Selection In all the studies that explore the transmission of cultural traits the issue
of selective migration based either on preferences or on economic incentives is crucial. As far
as preference based migration is concerned according to the argument advanced by Luttmer
and Singhal (2011), the fact that migrants from many di¤erent countries move to a number
of European countries, makes it less likely that selection is a major concern.
As to selective migration based on economic incentives, it cannot certainly be precluded
and therefore the robustness section extends the analysis to the sample of second generation
migrants. Reassuringly the results on second generation migrants conrm the ndings of the
baseline analysis. Interestingly though in the context of the current study if indeed selection
occurs based on the choice of a healthy institutional environment, the results are particularly
interesting because they highlight a potential dimension along which selection takes place.
4 Empirical Findings
The empirical section is structured in three parts. The rst part establishes the persistent
e¤ect of institutions over culture. The analysis suggests that lower quality of institutions at
the origin country is associated with higher trust in institutions at the host country. The
inated trust of migrants is referred to as the Great Expectations e¤ect. The second part
explores whether preferences in the origin country are a¤ecting attitudes in the host country
and conducts a horserace analysis between preferences and institutions in the origin country.
The results conrm that indeed it is the institutional quality that survives the horserace
analysis. Finally the third part explores the policy implications of the Great Expectations
e¤ect. Overall, higher trust of migrants, driven by the bad institutional quality at the home
country, is associated with lower demand for regulation and lower political participation of
migrants in the host country.
4.1 Stage 1: The Persistent E¤ect of Institutions on Culture
Table 1 establishes that lower institutional quality in the origin country, measured by the
average level of corruption, has a positive and signicant e¤ect on individual trust in insti-
tutions in the host country. In particular, four measures of individual trust in institutions
are employed. Column (1) explores the e¤ect of institutions in individual trust in parliament,
Column (2) for trust in the legal system, Column (3) for trust in politicians and Column (4)
for trust in the police. The analysis controls for a number of individual controls such as age,
age square, gender, educational level and employment status. All specications include a set
of ESS round and of host country xed e¤ects. The former account for time shocks and trends
that are common to all European countries during the collection of the data for each round,
e.g. changes in policy. The latter capture all time invariant factors that can a¤ect individual
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attitudes, which are related to pre-existing conditions and factors such as local institutions
and culture, geography, climate, etc.
The coe¢ cient on the quality of institutions is positive and highly signicant across all
specications. This implies that an increase in corruption in the origin country is associated
with an increase in the level of individual trust in local institutions, an e¤ect that is referred
to as the Great Expectations e¤ect.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 2 replicates the same results only for the sample of ESS countries. The replication
of these results will be useful for the next section where the horserace between preferences and
institutional quality at the home country will be conducted for the ESS sample.11 Reassuringly
the results are as signicant, conrming the strong positive e¤ect of institutions on individual
trust. Moreover, despite the reduction in the sample, the coe¢ cients are stronger suggesting
that theGreat Expectations e¤ect becomes stronger when the sample is restricted to developed
countries, where migration has taken place primarily towards more developed countries.
Correlating native trust in institutions with the quality of local institutions yields a
negative correlation for the sample of ESS countries. Table B.1 in the Appendix reports the
regression coe¢ cients for trust of natives regressed on home institutions and the correlation is
positive and highly signicant, suggesting that lower quality of home institutions is associated
with lower native trust.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
4.2 Stage 2: Horserace Regressions between Institutional Quality
and Mean Preferences at the Origin Country
A critical aspect of the analysis is to explore whether culture operates via institutions or via
preferences at the country of origin.12 Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 3 record the
estimates of the mean preference at the country of origin that capture the impact on trust of
migrants in parliament, the legal system, politicians and in police respectively, while control-
ling for the full set of controls and ESS round and host country xed e¤ects. Interestingly the
mean preference at the origin country have no e¤ect in individual trust of migrants for the case
of trust in parliament and the police. As far as trust in the legal system and the politicians is
concerned, the coe¢ cient is highly signicant and positive in line with the suggested literature
11In order to calculate the average level of trust for each of the four variables, the native sample of ESS is
employed. This implies that the maximum number of countries for which the estimation of the average e¤ect
is feasible is thirty.
12This approach has been adopted by Luttmer and Singhal (2011) who have established that preferences for
redistribution at the home country are a signicant determinant of preferences for redistribution of migrants.
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that reports inertia in preferences (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Litina et al., 2014). However,
once introducing into the analysis the control for the quality of institutions at the home
country (Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)) the signicance of the coe¢ cients on preferences
drops in all four cases whereas the estimates for the institutional quality are signicant and
positive suggesting the dominance of institutional quality over average preferences.
The point estimates of the coe¢ cients are quite similar to those of Table 2.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
4.3 The E¤ect on Demand Regulation and Political Involvement
In the presence of large scale migration it is crucial to underline the policy implications
of the Great Expectations e¤ect. In line with Aghion et al. (2010), who suggested that
more trust is associated with less demand for regulation, it is explored whether the inated
trust of migrants is a¤ecting their demand for regulation in the host country as well as their
political involvement. Four policy measures are considered: i) the view of individuals on
whether political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned; ii) whether
individuals have actually participated in a demonstration during the last 12 months; iii)
whether individuals have signed a petition during the last 12 months; and iv) describing how
interested they are in politics. Higher values in all four cases imply less demand for regulation.
This result suggests that institutions and culture coevolve simultaneously. It can be claimed
that this process takes place rather slowly given the limited intervention that migrants can
make in the host countries, nevertheless the interaction of a variety of cultural traits ultimately
a¤ects the evolution of institutions.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 explore the reduced form equation on the e¤ect of corrup-
tion at the origin country in each of these of these policy outcomes correspondingly, while
controlling for the full set of controls, i.e. age, age square, gender, education, employment
status, ESS round and host country xed e¤ects. The analysis is conducted for the full sample
of 167 countries of origin of migrants. Reassuringly, the coe¢ cients in all four columns are
positive and highly signicant suggesting that higher corruption at the origin country makes
individuals less active and less interested in politics and in demand for regulation in the host
country.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The structural model suggests that corruption at the origin country a¤ects demand
for regulation at the host country via its e¤ect on the trust of migrants. To explore this
channel, Columns (1)-(4) of Table 5 augment the analysis of Table 4 by all four measures
of trust (trust in parliament, the legal system, polity and the police). In all fours cases the
coe¢ cients on corruption reduce somewhat in magnitude and in signicance (Columns (2) and
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(4)) suggesting that the e¤ect on demand for regulation partly operates via trust. Moreover
all coe¢ cients on trust are positive and signicant, in line with the analysis of Aghion et al.
(2010), suggesting that more trust is associated with less demand for regulation. The only
measure of trust that is not signicant in most specications is trust in the police.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
5 Discussion
This section discusses several issues that allow for a better understanding of the Great Expec-
tations e¤ect. First, to highlight the contradiction with the standard measure on interpersonal
trust, the rst two stages of the analysis are replicated for the measure of trust. The results
suggest that there is no evidence of the Great Expectations e¤ect when interpersonal trust
is considered. Second the analysis explores the source of the Great Expectations e¤ect, i.e.
whether it is driven by migrants moving to high quality of institutions countries or vice versa.
The ndings suggest that no prticular group drives the results. Last, the analysis employs
some additional measures that capture more short run attitudes of migrants (satisfaction
about several institutions) as well as some more practical aspects of a countrys life that are
directly relevant for the migrants, such as satisfaction with education and health.
5.1 Trust in Institutions vs. Interpersonal Trust
To highlight the fact that the great expectations e¤ect occurs only for trust in institutions,
the results are compared with the results for interpersonal trust. The related literature has
documented that trust at the home country is positively correlated with trust at the host
country thereby conrming the inertia of trust attitudes (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Moreover,
Table 6 establishes that higher corruption at the home country is associated with lower trust
in the host country, while exploring the full set of migrants coming from 167 country. Column
(1) establishes this result for the total sample of migrants, whereas Columns (2) and (3)
explore the results for the samples of rst and second generation migrants respectively. All
three columns controls for the full set of baseline controls (i.e. age, gender, education and
employment status) as well ESS round and host country xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cients on
corruption are negative and signicant, in contrast to the results about trust in institutions.
Therefore migrants, once they move to a new country they form Great Expectations about
the host country institutions but not about the people in the host country.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
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Table 7 restricts the analysis to the sample of migrants coming from 29 countries
(European migrants moving to European countries) in order to explore the role of preferences.
Column (1) reports the e¤ect of mean trust at the origin country on the interpersonal trust
of migrants. The coe¢ cient is positive and highly signicant conrming the persistent e¤ect
of preference at the home country on migrants attitudes (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Litina
et al., 2014). Column (2) reports the results of regressing interpersonal trust in the mean level
of corruption at the home country. In line with the analysis in Table 6, more trust in the home
country is associated with lower trust in the host country even for the sample of European
countries only. Column (3) runs the horserace between the two, indicating that both home
institutions and home preferences have a signicant e¤ect on interpersonal trust. All three
columns controls for the full set of controls of the baseline analysis.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
5.2 Source of the Great Expectations E¤ect: Migrants Coming
from Countries with Better or Worse Institutions?
This section explores the source of the "great expectations e¤ect" i.e. whether it originates
from migrants that move from low quality of institutions countries towards countries with
high institutional quality or vice versa? Taking as the explanatory variable di¤erences in
institutional quality cannot provide an answer as the variation of the institutional quality of
the host country would be absorbed by the host country xed e¤ect. To address this concern
the analysis constructs a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if corruption in the host
country is lower than corruption in the origin country and the value of one if the opposite
holds. Then the variable on corruption in the origin country is interacted with this dummy.
Table 8 replicates the results of the baseline analysis after including this interactive term
and the newly created dummy. Whereas the coe¢ cient on corruption at the origin country
retains its signicance, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is not statistically signicant
thereby suggesting that the result is not driven by any of the two groups particularly. The
results have also been replicated by assuming a di¤erent structure of the model, i.e. by
interacting all baseline controls with the dummy variable and yet the ndings are quite similar




5.3 Satisfaction of Migrants
This section employs four new measures that reect how satised are migrants with the
economy, democracy, education and health. The value added of this approach lies in two
things. First, the measure of satisfaction is not the direct equivalent of the measure of trust.
Whereas both measures are explicitly asked for the country where the migrant resides in,
nevertheless the measure on trust is more broadly expressed, i.e. the question is formulated as
"please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.
Firstly [country]s politicians". The emphasis is placed on personal trust in the institutions
of the country but it is explicitly expressed in a way to capture the overall feeling. On the
contrary the measure about satisfaction is aimed to capture current satisfaction of the migrant.
In particular the question is expressed as e.g. "How satised with the state of health services
in the country nowadays".
Besides the "short run satisfaction" and "long run trust" distinction, a second element
is that the questions about satisfaction capture the satisfaction of migrants not only towards
institutions with which they do not directly interact, such as the (broader notion of) the
economy and democracy, but also with institutions which they are directly faced with such as
education and health.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 9 explore the e¤ect of home institutions on migrant
satisfaction with the economy and the democracy, while controlling for all the baseline con-
trols. Despite the short run and long run distinction, nevertheless the coe¢ cients are highly
signicant and positive conrming even with use of alternative measures the presence of the
Great Expectations e¤ect.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
On the contrary, the ndings in Columns (3) and (4) where the outcome variables
are satisfaction of migrants with respect to the educational and the health system of the
country, do not report any signicance of the coe¢ cients. A plausible interpretation for this
nding is that migrants from poor countries rarely have full and equal access to these services.
For instance if many migrants are working without insurance or when children from large
minorities cannot exercise their language, this implies that despite the (most likely) better
quality than that at their birth place, yet they may not have access to the full range of services
and this is reected in their dissatisfaction.
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6 Robustness
The robustness section establishes the robustness of the main results to a number of alternative
specications and assumptions such as additional individual and country of origin controls, to
the use of alternative measures of institutional quality, the validity of the results for the rst
and second generation migrants, as well as the robustness of the estimation.
6.1 First and Second Generation Migrants
Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the baseline analysis for rst and second generation
migrants separately. This approach allows to trace the cultural transmission mechanism and
to suppress selection concerns. As in the baseline analysis, the country of origin is that of the
individual for rst generation migrants and that of their father for second generation migrants.
As expected the results for the rst generation migrants (Table 10) are quite similar to
those in the baseline analysis. All four coe¢ cients are positive and highly signicant conrming
and establishing the strength of theGreat Expectations e¤ect which is particularly pronounced
for the rst generation migrants.
[TABLE 10 HERE]
The results of Table 11 surprisingly conrm the presence of the Great Expectations
e¤ect even for second generation migrants despite the fact that choosing this particular sample
addresses more e¤ectively the issue of selection. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of home institutions
is so persistent that is even transmitted to second generation migrants. They only variable for
which this e¤ect is not transmitted till the second generation is the case of police, reecting
that interaction with the police is more direct and specic than e.g. the legal system.
[TABLE 11 HERE]
Overall the ndings of this section are quite important since they establish that even
in the absence of selection issues and of direct shocks to the behavior of migrant (such as
language barriers) that are inherent to the rst generation migrants, the home institutions
still have a persistent e¤ect on the culture of second generation migration and therefore on
the evolution of local institutions.
6.2 Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality and Periods
This section establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to the use of two alternative
measures of institutional quality, e.g. the WGI measure on control of corruption and the ICRG
measure of corruption. Moreover the two measures are employed for di¤erent periods as well,
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i.e. the WGI measure on control of corruption is the mean value for the period 1996-2000
while the ICRG measure of corruption is the mean value of the period 1986-2000.
[TABLE 12 HERE]
These alternative measures are quite critical since they address a concern that is
inherent in the estimation of the perceived corruption level. The Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) is constructed using 13 di¤erent polls each year and aggregating them accordingly.
However, these polls are based solely upon perception and are subject to sharp movements in
the presence of important events, e.g. a scandal. This concern is already addressed by taking
the average of four years, an approach that smooths out the e¤ect of temporary shocks.
However this e¤ect is further mitigated by using alternative measure, such as the WGI or the
ICRG index which adopts a di¤erent collection method. Moreover the periods of aggregation
are di¤erent for each maser in an attempt to ensure that what matters is not the specic
years chosen, but instead the inertia in these phenomena of corruption that have formulated
the perception of people. Moreover, in line with the Fernández and Fogli (2009) argument,
to the extend that culture is slowly evolving, one should be able to nd a signicant e¤ect
of home conditions on cultural attitudes of migrants even if home conditions are measured at
later period. Similarly for the institutional quality measures, whereas they reect perceptions
and are thus vulnerable to shocks, nevertheless it is plausible to argue that Greece would
systematically score higher corruption than Sweden.
[TABLE 13 HERE]
Reassuringly, as Tables 12 and 13 conrm, the results are robust to the use of all
alternative measure and periods of time.13 The rst four columns of each table report the
results for trust in institutions, whereas the last column reports the results for interpersonal
trust. The sign of the coe¢ cients is in line with the ndings in the baseline analysis, i.e.
positive for the measures of trust in institutions, thereby conrming the Great Expectations
e¤ect, and negative for the measure of interpersonal trust. The magnitude is somewhat larger,
yet it is the same order of magnitude as the CPI measure.
6.3 Paternal and Spouse Controls
This section establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to the use of additional parental
and spouse controls such as paternal, maternal and spousal education. Whereas it is argued
that the transmission mechanism operates primarily via the e¤ect of parents on the forma-
13Similar results are obtained if the period extends till 2010, as well as using additional measures of
institutional quality. The results are not reported.
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tion of their o¤springs culture, yet it is important to net out any potential e¤ects of their
educational level that could have a¤ected their assimilation process and via this the cultural
transmission of trust traits. Similarly, the educational level of the spouse could as well have
a pronounced e¤ect in the assimilation process and the transmission of cultural traits to the
o¤springs.
[TABLE 14 HERE]
Table 14 addresses these concerns by including controls for parental and spousal
educational level. The ndings conrm that country of origin institutions have a persistent
e¤ect on culture after netting out parental and spousal inuence. Interestingly enough the
only control that confers a statistically signicant e¤ect on individual trust is the educational
level of the mother which is positively correlated with the trust level of the individual, a
nding that contradicts the nding on the e¤ect of individuals education, which is negative
and implies that higher education is associated with lower trust in institutions reecting the
awareness that comes through education.
6.4 More Individual Controls and Assimilation Process
This section introduces an array of individual controls that are important in explaining
individual attitudes for two reason. First because they better reect the socioeconomic status
of the individual (e.g. controls about income and religiosity) and second because they capture
the assimilation speed of the individual (e.g. controls about the citizenship of the individual,
whether (s)he voted in the last election, whether the individual is a member of a discriminated
group or not). These controls are not employed in the baseline specication since they are
available only for a smaller subsample of individuals.
[TABLE 15 HERE]
Table 15 introduces all these controls, for all four trust variables. The coe¢ cients are
in all four cases highly signicant despite the larger number of controls and the signicant
reduced sample, thereby conrming the presence of the Great Expectations e¤ect even after
fully accounting for the socioeconomic status of the migrant and the extend to which (s)he
has assimilated.
6.5 Mothers Country of Origin
A stand of the literature has argued that the transmission mechanism is stronger via the
inuence of mothers. To explore this idea, the analysis makes the assumption that the country
of origin is that of the mother instead of that of the father for the case of second generation
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migrants. The results remain largely una¤ected. The results are also robust to restricting the
sample to only this set of migrant whose fathers and mothers are both migrants and come from
the same country of origin. While the sample is somewhat smaller, the results are una¤ected
as well (results not reported).
[TABLE 16 HERE]
6.6 More Controls from the Origin Country
Whereas in the discussion part of the paper it has been extensively explored whether the
Great Expectations e¤ect comes from migrant from poorer or richer countries, nevertheless
this section further addresses this issue by controlling for income per capita at the home
country. While the coe¢ cients reduce somewhat in magnitude and in signicance for the case




This research establishes the persistent e¤ect of institutions over culture exploiting the natural
experiment of migration. It advances and empirically establishes the hypothesis that lower
institutional quality at the origin country of a migrant is associated with higher trust towards
host country institutions. The "inated" trust of migrants is documented as the Great
Expectations e¤ect and is interesting for three di¤erent reasons. First it contradicts with the
empirically observed attitude of migrants with respect to interpersonal trust, where low quality
of institutions is associated with lower interpersonal trust in both the host and the home
country. Second, the "inated" trust persists for both rst and second generation migrants,
despite the fact that the former are not fully assimilated and thus partially excluded from
these institutions and the latter have no direct interaction with the origin institutions. Third,
the e¤ect of home institutions is stronger than the e¤ect of mean trust at home conrming
that it is institutions that prevail over culture and not culture as represented by the average
attitude at the origin country.
The formation of Great Expectations has profound policy implications. The analysis
has established that higher corruption at the origin country is associated with less demand for
regulation and less active participation in domestic politics. Moreover it establishes that this
e¤ect partly operates via the increased trust triggered by the low quality of institutions as
it generates lower demand for regulation and reduced political participation. These ndings
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further highlight the interplay between culture and institutions and the spillover e¤ects of
institutions operating via migration.
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Table 1: Great Expectations: The E¤ect of Corruption at the Origin Country on Trust in
Institutions at the Host Country
(1) (2) (3)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.083*** 0.049*** 0.070***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Age 0.004** 0.000 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Age Square -0.000** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.129*** -0.050 0.008
(0.040) (0.037) (0.031)
Education (Lower Secondary) 0.013 0.055 -0.018
(0.079) (0.072) (0.073)
Education (Upper Secondary) -0.021 -0.084 -0.185***
(0.070) (0.054) (0.065)
Lower Tertiary 0.079 0.038 -0.151
(0.144) (0.156) (0.123)
Higher Tertiary 0.378*** 0.307*** 0.003
(0.072) (0.088) (0.079)
Unemployment -0.364*** -0.380*** -0.263***
(0.080) (0.075) (0.083)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 169 169 169
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30
Obs. 20776 20776 20499
R-sq. 0.155 0.157 0.141
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations
e¤ect, for the sample of all migrants. Analytically, the trust of migrants
in: i) the parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians, and
iv) the police, is positively correlated with the level of corruption at
the home country. The analysis controls for individual characteristics
such as age, age square, gender, educational level and employment
status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 2: Great Expectations: The E¤ect of Corruption at the Origin Country on Trust in
Institutions at the Host Country
(1) (2) (3)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.045*** 0.008 0.036**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Age 0.004** -0.002 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age Square -0.000** 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women -0.097* -0.047 0.027
(0.056) (0.040) (0.033)
Education (Lower Secondary) -0.016 -0.053 -0.075
(0.092) (0.087) (0.082)
Education (Upper Secondary) 0.017 -0.073 -0.151*
(0.078) (0.077) (0.082)
Lower Tertiary 0.047 -0.097 -0.143
(0.182) (0.171) (0.163)
Higher Tertiary 0.427*** 0.301** 0.052
(0.086) (0.109) (0.115)
Unemployment -0.360*** -0.499*** -0.246**
(0.111) (0.080) (0.109)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 29 29 29
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30
Obs. 12287 12287 12121
R-sq. 0.166 0.188 0.147
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations
e¤ect, for the sample of all migrants. Analytically, the trust of migrants
in: i) the parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians, and
iv) the police, is positively correlated with the level of corruption at
the home country. The analysis controls for individual characteristics
such as age, age square, gender, educational level and employment
status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Policy Considertations: The E¤ect of Corruption in the Origin Country on
Regulation in the Host Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ban Participate in Signed How Interested
Parties Demonstration Petition in Politics
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.035*** 0.005** 0.016*** 0.016**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Age -0.021*** 0.002 -0.003** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age Square 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women 0.188*** 0.015** -0.001 0.270***
(0.025) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Education -0.143*** -0.015*** -0.040*** -0.178***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012)
Employment -0.001 -0.017* 0.024 0.046
(0.042) (0.010) (0.018) (0.029)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 167 167 167 167
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30 30
Obs. 22311 22311 22311 22311
R-sq. 0.066 0.015 0.044 0.125
Summary: This table establishes that higher corruption in the origin country is
associated with lower demand from regulation in the host country. The analysis
controls for individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational
level and employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The index
takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Ban
Partiescorresponds to the question Using this card, please say to what extent you
agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Political parties that wish to
overthrow democracy should be banned. The variable takes values from 1 to 5 with
1 denoting Agree Stronglyand 5 denoting Disagree Strongly; (iii) Participate
in Demonstrationcorresponds to the question During the last 12 months, have you
done any of the following? Firstly ...Taken part in a lawful public demonstration.
The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yes and 2 denoting No; (iv) Signed
Petition corresponds to the question During the last 12 months, have you done
any of the following? Firstly...Signed a petition. The variable is binary with 1
denoting Yesand 2 denoting No; (v) Interested in Politicscorresponds to the
question How interested would you say you are in politicswith 1 denoting Very
Interestedand 4 denoting Hardly Interested; (vi) robust standard error estimates,
clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii)
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 5: Policy Considertations: Horserace between Corruption in the Host Country and
Trust in Insitutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ban Participate in Signed How Interested
Parties Demonstration Petition in Politics
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.024*** 0.004* 0.015*** 0.012*
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Trust in Parliament 0.007*** 0.000** 0.001** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trust in the Legal System 0.004*** 0.000 0.001* 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trust in Polity 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trust in the Police 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 167 167 167 167
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30 30
Obs. 22311 22311 22311 22311
R-sq. 0.092 0.019 0.049 0.142
Summary: This table establishes that one of the channels via which
corruption in the origin country is a¤ecting demand for regulation in the
host country, is via a¤ecting the trust of migrants to the institutions.
To establish that the table shows the horcerace between corruption in the
origin country and all four measures of trust. The analysis controls for
individual characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level and
employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The index
takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Ban
Parties corresponds to the question Using this card, please say to what extent
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Political parties that
wish to overthrow democracy should be banned. The variable takes values from
1 to 5 with 1 denoting Agree Stronglyand 5 denoting Disagree Strongly; (iii)
Participate in Demonstration corresponds to the question During the last 12
months, have you done any of the following? Firstly ...Taken part in a lawful public
demonstration. The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yesand 2 denoting No;
(iv) Signed Petitioncorresponds to the question During the last 12 months, have
you done any of the following? Firstly...Signed a petition. The variable is binary
with 1 denoting Yesand 2 denoting No; (v) Interested in Politicscorresponds
to the question How interested would you say you are in politicswith 1 denoting
Very Interestedand 4 denoting Hardly Interested; (vi) "Trust in Parliament"
takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (vii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no
trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (viii) "Trust in Politicians" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(ix) "Trust in the Police" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (x) robust standard error estimates, clustered at
the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the
10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 6: Interpersonal Trust
(1) (2) (3)
Interpersonal Trust
All Migrants First Generation Second Generation








Education (Lower Secondary) 0.201***
(0.073)








ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 169 169 169
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30
Obs. 20776
R-sq. 0.098
Summary:.This table establishes that higher corruption at the origin
country is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust at the host
country. Therefore the Great Expectations e¤ect does not hold for
the case of interpersonal trust. The analysis controls for individual
characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level and
employment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be trusted
or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0
denoting "Cant be too careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be trusted";
(iii) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (iv) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 29 29 29
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30
Obs. 12287
R-sq. 0.118
Summary: This table establishes that the e¤ect of
institutions at the origin country is stronger than the
e¤ect of mean preferences at the origin country. The
analysis conducts horserace regressions while controlling
for individual characteristics such as age, age square,
gender, educational level and employment status as
well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption
Perception Index. The index takes values from 0-10 with
10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) "Interpersonal
Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be
trusted or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values
from 0 to 10 with 0 denoting "Cant be too careful" and
10 denoting "Most people can be trusted"; (iii) the mean
preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences; (iv) robust
standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table 8: The Source of the Great Expectations E¤ect-Migrants from Low Quality of
Institutions Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.421*** 0.290*** 0.623*** 0.167***
(0.138) (0.092) (0.095) (0.054)
Corruption X Dummy 0.283 0.077 0.155 -0.068
(0.252) (0.202) (0.285) (0.202)
Dummy 1.117 1.072 -0.431 -0.852
(3.244) (2.399) (3.213) (2.023)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 167 167 167 167
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30 30
Obs. 22288 22288 22288 22288
R-sq. 0.049 0.023 0.039 0.016
Summary: This table establishes that the "Great Expectations" e¤ect
is driven by all types of migrants, i.e. the ones that move to high
institutions countries and the ones moving to low institutions coutnries.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
The variable dummy takes the value of 0 if corruption in the host country is
lower than corruption in the origin country and the value of one if the opposite
holds; (iii) "Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no
trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iv) "Trust in the Legal System"
takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting
"complete trust"; (v) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0
denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (vi) "Trust in
the Police" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10
denoting "complete trust"; (vii) robust standard error estimates, clustered at
the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses; (viii) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 9: Short-Run vs Long-Run Attitudes: Satisfaction with Respect to Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Satised with (all Migrants)
Economy Democracy Education Health
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.225*** 0.325*** -0.183 -0.072
(0.061) (0.070) (0.145) (0.065)
Age -0.369*** -0.300*** -0.220*** -0.201***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.035)
Age Square 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women 1.065*** 2.500*** -0.625** -0.578***
(0.195) (0.342) (0.290) (0.156)
Education -0.666*** -1.443*** -0.919*** -0.280***
(0.087) (0.168) (0.281) (0.074)
Employment -1.193*** -0.521 -0.364 0.228
(0.263) (0.525) (0.578) (0.470)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Origin Countries 167 167 167 167
No. of Host Countries 30 30 30 30
R-sq. 22311 22311 22311 22311
Countries 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.031
Summary: This table establishes that the Great Expectations e¤ect is not
related to satisfaction of migrants with respect to the economy, democ-
racy, education and health services. The analysis controls for individual
characteristics such as age, age square, gender, educational level and em-
ployment status as well as for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Satisfaction with the Economy" corresponds to the question "How satised with
present state of economy in country". The variable takes values from 0 to 10
with 0 denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised"; (iii)
"Satisfaction with Democracy" corresponds to the question "How satised with
the way democracy works in country". The variable takes values from 0 to 10
with 0 denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised"; (iv)
"Satisfaction with Education" corresponds to the question "How satised with the
state of education in the country nowadays". The variable takes values from 0 to 10
with 0 denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised"; (v)
"Satisfaction with Health" corresponds to the question "How satised with the state
of health services in the country nowadays". The variable takes values from 0 to
10 with 0 denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of
origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table 10: Great Expectations E¤ect: First Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.364** 0.311*** 0.623*** 0.186***
(0.152) (0.099) (0.101) (0.064)
Age -0.411*** -0.323*** -0.227*** -0.187***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.072) (0.038)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Women 2.318*** 1.691*** 2.263*** 1.306***
(0.359) (0.288) (0.311) (0.200)
Education -0.890*** -0.489*** -1.065*** -0.242**
(0.167) (0.123) (0.185) (0.093)
Employment 0.123 -0.099 -0.101 -0.364
(0.803) (0.660) (0.601) (0.401)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 13352 13352 13352 13352
R-sq. 0.053 0.023 0.042 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations
e¤ect, for the sample of rst generation migrants. Analytically, the trust
of migrants in: i) the parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians,
and iv) the police, is positively correlated with the level of corruption at the
home country, while controlling for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
35
Table 11: Great Expectations E¤ect: Second Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.232** 0.129** 0.214*** 0.020
(0.099) (0.062) (0.070) (0.056)
Age -0.311*** -0.251*** -0.235*** -0.060**
(0.040) (0.044) (0.036) (0.024)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women 1.026*** 0.916*** 0.729*** 0.208
(0.181) (0.189) (0.239) (0.160)
Education -0.578*** -0.531*** -0.306*** -0.022
(0.135) (0.152) (0.115) (0.112)
Employment -0.778* -1.134* -0.287 -0.440
(0.460) (0.621) (0.483) (0.306)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8959 8959 8959 8959
R-sq. 0.039 0.025 0.029 0.017
Summary: This table establishes the presence of the Great Expectations
e¤ect, for the sample of second generation migrants. Analytically, the trust
of migrants in: i) the parliament, ii) the legal system, iii) the politicians,
and iv) the police, is positively correlated with the level of corruption at the
home country, while controlling for ESS round and host country xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 12: Robustness to Alternative Measure of Corruption and Alternative Time Periods-
WGI Corruption Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust in Interpersonal
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police Trust
Control of Corruption 0.991*** 0.694*** 1.172*** 0.377*** -0.068*
(0.232) (0.155) (0.173) (0.088) (0.035)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 22315 22315 22315 22315 22315
R-sq. 0.015 0.049 0.023 0.038 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the baseline
results to the use of alternative measures of institutional quality. .
Notes: (i) "Control of Corruption" is measured by the World Governance Indicators
measure. The index ranges from -2.5 (strong) to 2.5 (weal) governance performance.
The mean value for the period 1996-2000 is employed; (ii) "Trust in Parliament" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii)
"Trust in the Legal System" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and
10 denoting "complete trust"; (iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0
denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police"
takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) "Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be trusted or you
cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0 denoting "Cant be
too careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be trusted"; (vii) robust standard error
estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses;
(viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 13: Robustness to Alternative Measure of Corruption and Alternative Time Periods-
ICRG Corruption Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust in Interpersonal
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police Trust
ICRG Corruption 0.725*** 0.488*** 0.877*** 0.230*** -0.086***
(0.195) (0.147) (0.182) (0.088) (0.030)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 20938 20938 20938 20938 20938
R-sq. 0.050 0.023 0.038 0.016 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the baseline
results to the use of alternative measures of institutional quality. .
Notes: (i) "ICRG Corruption" is using the ICRG index that ranges from 0 (least
corrupt country) to 6 (most corrupt country) 1984-2000 is employed; (ii) "Trust in
Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting
"complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting
"no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust
in the Police" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting
"complete trust"; (vi) "Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people
can be trusted or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with
0 denoting "Cant be too careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be trusted"; (vii)
robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are
reported in parentheses; (viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, **
at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 14: Robustness: Paternal and Spousal Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.500*** 0.358*** 0.623*** 0.186***
(0.128) (0.079) (0.088) (0.047)
Age -0.298*** -0.259*** -0.167*** -0.121***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.048) (0.026)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women 1.884*** 1.408*** 1.703*** 0.893***
(0.239) (0.194) (0.220) (0.131)
Education -0.711*** -0.435*** -0.750*** -0.141*
(0.140) (0.094) (0.142) (0.074)
Employment -0.165 -0.452 -0.153 -0.384
(0.570) (0.529) (0.458) (0.315)
Paternal Education 0.009 0.014* 0.008 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Maternal Education 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.009**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Spousal Education -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 22311 22311 22311 22311
R-sq. 0.050 0.024 0.040 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the presence of
the Great Expectations e¤ect, after augmenting the baseline analy-
sis with controls for paternal, maternal and spousal educational level
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 15: Robustness: Additional Individual Controls and Assimilation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.363*** 0.289*** 0.469*** 0.137***
(0.097) (0.067) (0.069) (0.045)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious Person FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Citizenship FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Voted in the Last Election Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member of a Discriminated Group Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15161 15161 15161 15161
R-sq. 0.065 0.029 0.051 0.024
Summary:.This table establishes the robustness of the baseline analy-
sis to the introduction of additional controls including religious per-
son, income, citizenship, vote in the last election and member of
a discriminated group FE. The additional controls ensure that all
important aspects of an individuals life are controlled for includ-
ing controls that capture the extent of assimilation of the migrant.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 16: Robustness: Mothers Country of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.435*** 0.356*** 0.544*** 0.176***
(0.111) (0.069) (0.081) (0.049)
Age -0.328*** -0.264*** -0.200*** -0.137***
(0.041) (0.033) (0.046) (0.024)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Women 2.033*** 1.521*** 1.735*** 0.958***
(0.259) (0.256) (0.198) (0.155)
Education -0.818*** -0.533*** -0.846*** -0.211***
(0.132) (0.097) (0.127) (0.076)
Employment -0.440 -0.623 -0.138 -0.322
(0.675) (0.605) (0.465) (0.349)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 21823 21823 21823 21823
R-sq. 0.049 0.024 0.037 0.015
Summary:.This table establishes the robustness of the analysis by using
as the country of origin the origin of the mother of the migrant.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The
index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii)
"Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes values
from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust";
(vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country
of origin, are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 17: Robustness: Controlling for Income per Capita of the Origin Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.370** 0.375*** 0.441*** 0.202**
(0.184) (0.140) (0.124) (0.083)
Log GDP per Capita (Origin Country) -0.360 0.077 -0.533** 0.069
(0.337) (0.285) (0.252) (0.184)
Age -0.301*** -0.266*** -0.180*** -0.119***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.048) (0.025)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Women 1.890*** 1.432*** 1.753*** 0.898***
(0.238) (0.192) (0.209) (0.125)
Education -0.749*** -0.483*** -0.780*** -0.158**
(0.136) (0.096) (0.137) (0.075)
Employment -0.167 -0.369 -0.205 -0.357
(0.569) (0.530) (0.441) (0.310)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 22268 22268 22268 22268
R-sq. 0.049 0.023 0.039 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the baseline analysis to the
inclusion of additional controls fromteh origin country, in particular the level of
income per capita which reects the stage of developement of the country analysis
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The index takes
values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country; (ii) Log GDP per capita
comes from the WDI and denotes the average level of income per capita of the origin
country for the period 1980-2009; (iii) "Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with
0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iv) "Trust in the Legal
System" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (v) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all",
and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (vi) "Trust in the Police" takes values from 0-10 with
0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (vii) robust standard error
estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in parentheses;
(viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 18: Robustness: Double Clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Origin Country) 0.500*** 0.357*** 0.623*** 0.186***
(0.182) (0.109) (0.151) (0.055)
Age -0.301*** -0.267*** -0.183** -0.119**
(0.065) (0.049) (0.074) (0.055)
Age Square 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women 1.867*** 1.411*** 1.703*** 0.882***
(0.442) (0.210) (0.347) (0.166)
Education -0.754*** -0.478*** -0.794*** -0.157
(0.178) (0.146) (0.161) (0.113)
Employment -0.130 -0.406 -0.097 -0.377
(0.681) (0.641) (0.370) (0.346)
ESS Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 22311 22311 22311 22311
R-sq. 0.049 0.023 0.038 0.016
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the
baseline analysis to clustering the standard errots at the
dimension of the country of origin and of the host country.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index.
The index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country;
(ii) "Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no
trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (vi) robust standard error estimates, clustered at the dimension of the
country of origin and of the host country, are reported in parentheses; (vii) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,





Table A.1: Countries of Origin of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Afghanistan 11 40 The Netherlands 11
Antigua 2 3 United Kingdom 2
Albania 13 291 Greece 259
Armenia 13 66 Russia 26
Angola 6 107 Portugal 96
Argentina 14 94 Israel 36
American Samoa 1 2 United Kingdom 2
Austria 22 278 Switzerland 108
Australia 9 34 United Kingdom 19
Aruba 1 7 The Netherlands 7
Azerbaijan 10 73 Russia 28
Bosnia 15 630 Croatia 310
Barbados 1 2 United Kingdom 2
Bangladesh 6 38 United Kingdom 27
Belgium 16 170 Luxembourg 57
Burkina Faso 2 2 Spain 1
Bulgaria 25 195 Turkey 43
Bahrain 1 1 United Kingdom 1
Burundi 3 7 Belgium 5
Benin 3 3 Ireland 1
Saint Barthelemy 1 1 Ukraine 1
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 United Kingdom 1
Bolivia 6 37 Spain 28
Brazil 17 187 Portugal 118
Belarus 13 373 Estonia 128
Canada 13 44 United Kingdom 14
Zair 7 22 Belgium 14
Central African Rep. 2 2 France 1
Congo 9 55 Belgium 17
Switzerland 12 60 France 14
This section summarizes the inows and outows of migrants for the full sample.
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Table A.2: Countries of Origin of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Cote dIvoire 3 15 France 12
Chile 14 60 Sweden 25
Cameroon 6 14 Switzerland 5
China 17 95 United Kingdom 15
Colombia 10 58 Spain 38
Cuba 7 29 Spain 18
Cape Verde 7 100 Portugal 76
Christmas Island 1 1 United Kingdom 1
Cyprus 4 35 Greece 19
Czech Republic 21 344 Slovakia 140
Germany 28 1098 Switzerland 363
Denmark 10 138 Sweden 61
Dominica 1 3 United Kingdom 3
Dominican Republic 8 21 Spain 11
Algeria 13 296 France 222
Ecuador 6 74 Spain 66
Estonia 10 50 Sweden 22
Egypt 13 91 Israel 46
Eritrea 7 20 Sweden 7
Spain 18 295 France 104
Ethiopia 8 75 Israel 61
Finland 14 321 Sweden 252
Faroe Islands 3 10 Denmark 7
France 23 539 Belgium 161
Gabon 2 3 France 2
United Kingdom 21 551 Ireland 316
Grenada 1 3 United Kingdom 3
Georgia 14 134 Greece 41
French Guiana 1 1 France 1
Ghana 8 34 United Kingdom 17
Tables A.1-A.6 show the migration ows categorized by birth coutnry, whereas Table
A.7 summarizes the migration ows by destination country.
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Table A.3: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Gibraltar 2 2 Spain 1
Greenland 1 10 Denmark 10
Gambia 4 9 Spain 5
Guinea 7 19 Portugal 12
Guadeloupe 2 5 France 3
Equatorial Guinea 1 2 France 2
Greece 17 215 Cyprus 58
Guatemala 3 5 Switzerland 3
Guinea-Bissau 2 13 Portugal 12
Guyana 2 4 United Kingdom 3
Hong Kong 3 9 United Kingdom 7
Honduras 2 4 Switzerland 3
Croatia 15 240 Slovenia 129
Haiti 3 8 France 6
Hungary 21 309 Slovakia 86
Indonesia 9 148 Netherlands 134
Ireland 10 186 United Kingdom 165
Israel 6 12 Germany 3
India 16 304 United Kingdom 155
Iraq 14 352 Israel 234
Iran 15 225 Israel 112
Iceland 5 20 Denmark 9
Italy 22 1038 Switzerland 369
Jamaica 4 65 United Kingdom 62
Jordan 7 9 Denmark 2
Japan 10 17 Belgium 3
Kenya 4 18 United Kingdom 11
Kyrgyzstan 5 20 Russia 14
Cambodia 3 10 France 6
Comoros 2 5 Sweden 3
47
Table A.4: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Saint Kittis and Nevis 1 1 United Kingdom 1
North Korea 4 8 France 5
South Korea 7 10 United Kingdom 3
Kuwait 2 2 Ireland 1
Kazahstan 9 158 Russia 66
Lao 3 5 France 3
Lebanon 12 68 Sweden 21
Saint Lucia 1 4 United Kingdom 4
Liechtenstein 3 4 Switzerland 2
Sri Lanka 9 72 Switzerland 26
Liberia 2 3 United Kingdom 2
Lithuania 13 108 Ireland 27
Luxembourg 4 8 Belgium 4
Latvia 13 71 Estonia 31
Libya 7 79 Israel 71
Morocco 15 871 Israel 435
Monaco 2 2 Sweden 1
Moldova 15 103 Israel 29
Montenegro 5 13 Slovenia 5
Madagascar 2 14 France 13
Macedonia 13 92 Sqitzerland 32
Mali 2 8 France 7
Myanmar 2 3 United Kingdom 2
Mongolia 1 1 Ireland 1
Macao 3 3 Portugal 1
Martinique 3 9 France 6
Mauritania 2 3 France 2
Malta 3 12 United Kingdom 9
Mauritius 7 27 United Kingdom 10
Maldives 2 6 Russia 5
48
Table A.5: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Mexico 5 13 Switzerland 6
Malaysia 6 18 Ireland 8
Mozambique 3 29 Portugal 27
Niger 1 1 Belgium 1
Nigeria 12 103 Ireland 47
Nicaragua 2 3 Spain 2
Netherlands 17 242 Belgium 114
Norway 8 94 Sweden 65
Nepal 4 5 Finland 2
New Zealand 4 7 United Kingdom 4
Panama 3 3 Israel 1
Peru 9 44 Spain 25
Philippines 15 87 Ireland 22
Pakistan 14 166 United Kingdom 90
Poland 27 1086 Israel 261
Puerto Rico 2 3 Spain 2
Palestinian Territory 10 32 Sweden 10
Portugal 13 469 Lxembourg 216
Paraguay 2 6 Spain 5
Reunion 3 5 France 3
Romania 27 652 Israel 201
Serbia 16 128 Switzerland 38
Russia 27 3230 Estonia 1461
Rwanda 5 8 Belgium 4
Saudi Arabia 1 1 United Kingdom 1
Solomon Island 1 1 United Kingdom 1
Seychelles 1 3 Norway 3
Sudan 8 17 Ireland 4
Sweden 13 127 Norway 63
Singapore 3 7 United Kingdom 5
Slovenia 9 44 Croatia 14
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Table A.6: Immigration Flows by Birth Country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number of
Destination Immigrants Prevalent Migrants to
Countries from Birth Destination Prevalent
Country Country Destin. Country
Slovakia 18 294 Czech Republic 216
Sierra Leone 1 2 United Kingdom 2
San Marino 1 1 Croatia 1
Senegal 6 29 France 15
Somalia 7 35 Sweden 9
Suriname 2 95 The Netherlands 94
Sao Tome and Principe 1 10 Portugal 10
Salvador 2 4 Spain 2
Syria 16 110 Israel 56
Swaziland 1 1 Israel 1
Chad 1 1 France 1
Togo 5 11 France 4
Thailand 12 38 Norway 8
Tajikistan 4 20 Russia 7
Timore Leste 1 1 Portugal 1
Turkmenistan 4 5 Russia 2
Tunisia 11 202 Israel 108
Turkey 19 911 Greece 255
Trididad and Tobago 2 3 United Kingdom 2
Taiwan 3 3 Switzerland 1
Tanzania 1 2 United Kingdom 2
Ukraine 27 841 Russia 237
Uganda 5 10 United Kingdom 4
United States 25 278 Israel 47
Uruguay 6 18 Israel 7
Uzbekistan 8 90 Russia 31
Venezuela 7 17 Spain 6
Vietnam 12 59 Switzerland 13
Yemen 4 185 Israel 182
Mayotte 1 1 France 1
South Africa 10 59 United Kingdom 24
Zambia 3 6 United Kingdom 3
Zimbambwe 2 16 United Kingdom 14
50
Table A.7: Migration Flows by Country of Destination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Distinct Number of Most Number
Birth Immigrants Prevalent Immigrants
Countries in Destin. Birth from most
Country Country Prevalent Country
Austria 46 465 Germany 90
Belgium 74 977 Italy 163
Bulgaria 15 132 Romania 36
Switzerland 98 1872 Italy 369
Cyprus 37 169 Greece 58
Czech Republic 17 349 Slovakia 216
Germany 87 1349 Poland 233
Denmark 70 468 Germany 94
Estonia 24 1987 Russia 1461
Spain 70 674 Morocco 101
Finland 41 161 Russia 49
France 88 1164 Algeria 222
United Kingdom 104 1128 Ireland 165
Greece 37 821 Albania 259
Croatia 14 382 Bosnia 310
Hungary 21 189 Romania 105
Ireland 76 922 Great Nritain 316
Israel 70 3086 Morocco 435
Italy 20 27 Croatia 2
Lithuania 50 629 Portugal 216
The Netherlands 79 786 Indonesia 134
Norway 63 482 Sweden 63
Poland 18 150 Germany 60
Portugal 37 458 Brazil 118
Russia 23 577 Ukraine 237
Sweden 84 1016 Finland 252
Slovenia 22 376 Croatia 129
Slovakia 13 286 Czech Republic 140
Turkey 13 85 Bulgaria 43
Ukraine 26 1209 Russia 944
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Table B.1: The E¤ect of Low Quality Institutions at Home on Native Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Native Trust in
Parliament Legal System Politicians Police
Corruption (Native) -0.971*** -1.052*** -0.760*** -0.983***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.045) (0.043)
No of Countries 30 30 30 30
R-sq. 0.879 0.864 0.826 0.912
Summary: This table shows that corruption at the home country
is negatively correlated with native trust thereby suggesting
that the Great Expectations e¤ects holds only for migrants.
Notes: (i) Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index.
The index takes values from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country;
(ii) "Trust in Parliament" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at
all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (iii) "Trust in the Legal System" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (iv) "Trust in Politicians" takes values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no
trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete trust"; (v) "Trust in the Police" takes
values from 0-10 with 0 denoting "no trust at all", and 10 denoting "complete
trust"; (vi) all measures are aggregated at the country level after excluding the
sample of migrants; (vii) the period explored for all dependent and explanatory
variables is the average of the years 2000-2010; (viii) robust standard error
estimates, clustered at the dimension of the country of origin, are reported in
parentheses; (ix) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, **
at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
B Additional Results
This section provides additional results.
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C Variable Denitions and Sources
This section provides an analytical overview of all the variables employed in the analysis.
C.1 ESS Variables
Outcome Variables
Trust in Parliament. "Trust in Parliament" corresponds to the question Using this card, please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means
you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s
parliament?
Mean Trust in Parliament. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in the Legal System. "Trust in the Legal System" corresponds to the question Using this
card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read
out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly
[country]s legal system?
Mean Trust in Legal System. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in Politicians. "Trust in Politicians" corresponds to the question Using this card, please
tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means
you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s
politicians?
Mean Trust in Politicians. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Trust in the Police. "Trust in the Police" corresponds to the question Using this card, please tell
me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you
do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]s police?
Mean Trust in the Police. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
Intepresonal Trust. "Interpersonal Trust" corresponds to the question "Most people can be trusted
or you cant be too careful". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0 denoting "Cant be too
careful" and 10 denoting "Most people can be trusted".
Mean Interpersonal Trust. The mean preferences of the origin country are estimated by taking
the weighted averaging of the native preferences for all ESS rounds.
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Satisfaction Economy. "Satisfaction with the Economy" corresponds to the question "How
satised with present state of economy in country". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0
denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised".
Satisfaction Democracy. "Satisfaction with Democracy" corresponds to the question "How
satised with the way democracy works in country". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0
denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised".
Satisfaction Education. "Satisfaction with Education" corresponds to the question "How satised
with the state of education in the country nowadays". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with
0 denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised".
Satisfaction Health. "Satisfaction with Health" corresponds to the question "How satised with
the state of health services in the country nowadays". The variable takes values from 0 to 10 with 0
denoting "extremely dissatised" and 10 denoting "extremely satised.
Ban Parties. Ban Parties corresponds to the question Using this card, please say to what
extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Political parties that wish to
overthrow democracy should be banned. The variable takes values from 1 to 5 with 1 denoting
Agree Stronglyand 5 denoting Disagree Strongly.
Demonstrations. Participate in Demonstrationcorresponds to the question During the last 12
months, have you done any of the following? Firstly ...Taken part in a lawful public demonstration.
The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yesand 2 denoting No.
Petition. Signed Petitioncorresponds to the question During the last 12 months, have you done
any of the following? Firstly...Signed a petition. The variable is binary with 1 denoting Yesand
2 denoting No.
Inerested in Politics. Interested in Politicscorresponds to the question How interested would
you say you are in politicswith 1 denoting Very Interestedand 4 denoting Hardly Interested.
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent.
Gender. The gender of the respondent.
Religious Denomination. The religious group in which the respondent belongs. The questionnaire
covers 8 broad categories of religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox,
Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern Religions, Other non-Christian Religions)
and a category of non-religious people.
Level of Education. The higher level of education attained by the respondent. The questionnaire
distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education (less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier
upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher
tertiary > MA level).
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Parental and Spouse Educational Level. The higher level of education attained by the respon-
dentsfather, mother and spouse. The questionnaire distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education
(less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary,
advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher tertiary > MA level).
C.2 Aggregate Variables
Corruption. Corruptionis measured by the Corruption Perception Index. The index takes values
from 0-10 with 10 indicating the most corrupt country. The measure has been modied compared
to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
Control of Corruption. "Control of Corruption" is measured by the World Governance Indicators
measure. The index ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. The measure
has been modied compared to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
ICRG Corruption. "ICRG Corruption" is using the ICRG index that ranges from 0 (least corrupt
country) to 6 (most corrupt country) 1984-2000 is employed. The measure has been modied
compared to the original one to facilitate interpretation.
GDP per Capita. Log GDP per capita comes from the WDI and denotes the average level of
income per capita of the origin country for the period 1980-2009
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